Requirements Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code by Editors,
654 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The merchant whose selling market is subject to fluctuation often seeks
a means, perhaps at a constant price, to assure a source of supply for his
raw materials which will relieve him of the burden of predicting his needs
beyond the time required for production. The common method of accom-
plishing this is to negotiate a requirements contract whereby the buyer binds
himself to purchase all of his requirements from the seller in exchange for
a promise from the seller to supply the buyer's needs. A manufacturer,
wishing to avoid the problem of correlating his production with future
demand, may seek an output contract in which he binds himself to. sell
all of his production to the buyer in return for the latter's promise to take
all of the output. In this way the seller may shift the burden of marketing
his production. Since the problems of output and requirements contracts
are in many respects similar, this Note will utilize the term requirements
contract to refer generally to both types of agreements.'
Requirements contracts have been held void by courts which took the
view that the terms of the agreement were too uncertain to be enforced, or
that since the buyer did not bind himself to have requirements, performance
of the contract depended on the buyer's whim and therefore lacked con-
sideration.2 More recent authority, however, recognizes that in the bar-
gained-for exchange of promises each party has limited his freedom to
some extent and that the terms "requirements" or "needs" supply a suffi-
ciently objective standard to be enforceable.3 Thus, today, the typical re-
1. On output contracts generally, see 1 WILLIsoN, CONTRAcrs §104(a)
(Williston and Thompson's ed. 1936); 2 WILLIsToN, SALEs § 464 (1924); Havig-
hurst and Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL L. REv. 1 (1932);
Notes, 2 Duy B.J. 180 (1952); 29 CoL. L. Rxv. 223 (1928).
2. See, e.g., Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535 (1873); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v.
Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921) (contract for require-
ments of "Special BB" glue held invalid since buyer did not bind self to have re-
quirements or not to sell other glue in competition). The view has been expressed
that the Schlegel decision was in part motivated by a desire to permit seller to avoid
a bad deal. See Havighurst and Berman, supra note 1, at 5.
3. See, e.g., El Rio Oil Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Asphalt Co., 95 Cal. App. 186,
213 P.2d 2 (1949); Matter of McNutt Co. v. Eckert, 257 N.Y. 100, 177 N.E. 386
(1931), citing Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Thacher, 229 N.Y. 172, 128 N.E.
124 (1920); Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1922).
In drafting a requirements contract, the language used should be fairly precise in
order to avoid a finding that there had been no binding agreement made by one
party. The obligation of one party to supply and the other to take requirements
must be definite. See Hoffmann v. Pfingsten, 260 Wis. 160, 50 N.W.2d 369 (1951) ;
Stradling v. Allied Housing Associates, Inc., 349 Pa. 405, 37 A.2d 585 (1944);
Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers' Lumber Co., 189 Iowa 1183, 179 N.W.
417 (1920). However, the preciseness of language required by some courts may
be lessened by the Uniform Commercial Code requirement that the agreement be con-
strued in light of reasonable commercial intent. See UCC § 2-306, comment 1
(Official Draft 1952).
All references to the Uniform Commercial Code (referred to throughout this
Note as UCC) are to the Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code as proposed
by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws, Text and Comments Edition (1952). The only state to adopt the
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quirements contract is generally held valid.4 Once enforceability is estab-
lished the problem arises as to the extent of the obligation undertaken by
each of the parties to the contract. Numerous problems such as the buyer's
obligation to remain in business, or the capacity at which a buyer's opera-
tions should continue, leave the law in this area somewhat uncertain. The
Uniform Commercial Code 5 specifically recognizes the validity of require-
ments contracts and undertakes to define the extent of obligations by im-
plying an agreement between the parties to act in good faith.6 This Note
will attempt to compare requirements contract law as it has existed with-
out the Code with the proposed law under the Code,7 and point to some
of the problems which may remain unsolved by the Code.
VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT
While courts generally find that the buyer who seeks to make a re-
quirements contract has, in promising not to buy his requirements else-
where, given a commitment sufficient and certain enough to support a
binding contract,8 there are some circumstances in which there is doubt
as to whether the buyer has obligated himself at all, or for an amount
certain enough to be enforceable. These problems of sufficiency of buyer's
obligation and of certainty occur where the buyer is a non-manufacturing
establishment, such as a jobber, and also where the buyer has no estab-
Code to date is Pennsylvania where it will take effect on July 1, 1954. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Purdon Supp. 1953). In enacting the UCC into law, Penn-
sylvania retained the same section numbers found in the official draft. Therefore,
no citation will be given to the Pennsylvania statute.
4. See 1 WILLISTON, CoNTAcTs § 104A (Williston and Thompson's ed. 1936).
5. For discussions of the Sales Article generally, see Hall, From Status to
Contract? [1952] Wis. L. REv. 3; Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales;
Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950); Rabel, The Sales Law in the
Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 17 U. OF CHl. L. REv. 427 (1950); Williston,
The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L. REv.
561 (1950).
6. There is, however, an exception to the good faith rule that prohibits tender
or demand of any amount unreasonably disproportionate to any estimate, or in the
absence of an estimate to past requirements. See text at note 17 infra.
7. The UCC § 2-306(1) provides:
"(1) A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the -buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur
in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated
estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to.any normal or otherwise com-
parable prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded."
A related problem embodying considerations similar to requirements contracts
is that of the exclusive dealing contract dealt with in UCC § 2-306(2): "Where
in connection with a contract for sale there is a lawful agreement for exclusive
dealing by either the seller or the buyer in the kind of goods concerned, good faith also
imposes on each party an obligation of due diligence."
Apparently §2-306(2) is based on the famous case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 18 N.E. 214 (1917) in which the court said that an
exclusive dealing contract impliedly imposes upon the dealer the duty to devote
reasonable efforts to sell the goods.
8. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 Fed. 19 (5th Cir.
1922); Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958 (9th Cir. 1918), cert.
denied, 257 U.S. 658 (1922); Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co., 154 Minn. 204, 191
N.W. 431 (1923).
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lished business at the time of making the contract, but signs a requirements
contract in contemplation of entering business.
Most courts will enforce a jobber's contract, 9 but a minority has
refused to do so, reasoning that since there is no physical plant by which
needs may be measured or reasonably approximated, the contract is simply
for what buyer chooses to buy or for an amount incapable of approxima-
tion and is therefore uncertain or lacks consideration. 0 In a falling market,
these courts have observed, a jobber could avoid loss if there were no
requirements, and requirements might be avoided simply by securing no
customers.
The comments to the requirements section of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code state that a contract for the requirements of a non-manufac-
turing establishment is included." Validation of a jobber's contract, like
validation of requirements contracts generally, would seem to be a logical
result of the Code's implication of a good faith standard. If the jobber has
an obligation to have good faith requirements, he has a duty which is both
binding and capable of measurement for purposes of enforcement; the
problem is no longer one of validity of the contract, but of defining the
good faith duty of the parties. The Code's attempt to facilitate a definition
of good faith in any situation will be discussed below.
12
A contract for the requirements of a non-established business is, like
a jobber's contract, subject to the possible charge of invalidity for uncer-
tainty or lack of consideration, for here, too, there is no existing physical
plant by which to measure requirements. Some courts have found con-
tracts for the requirements of a non-established business void for this rea-
son; 13 one court found sufficient consideration in the buyer's implied
promise not to buy from another; 14 another held the contract subject to an
implied condition that the buyer actually have begun business by the time
deliveries are to begin. 15 Neither the Code nor comments specifically deals
9. See, e.g., Baker v. Murray Tool & Supply Co., 137 Okla. 288, 279 Pac. 340
(1929) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Neuer Glass Co., 253 Fed. 161 (6th Cir. 1918) ;
Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 160 Ill. 85, 43 N.E. 774 (1895). See
also 1 CoRBIN, CONmrAcrs § 156 (1950).
10. Nassau Supply Co. v. Ice Service Co., 252 N.Y. 277, 169 N.E. 383 (1929);
cf. Hoffmann v. Pfingsten, 260 Wis. 160, 50 N.W.2d 369 (1951).
11. UCC §2-306, comment 1.
12. See text at note 17 infra.
13. American Trading Co. v. National Fiber and Insulation Co., 31 Del. 65,
111 Atl. 290 (1920); Pessin v. Fox Head Waukesha Corp., 230 Wis. 277, 282
N.W. 582 (1939).
14. "The contract was an undertaking on the purchaser's part to buy all of its
requirements at Pensacola from the defendant. . . . The defendant agreed to sell
to plaintiff all such requirements up to certain fixed quantities. Here was the
consideration of a promise both to do and to refrain from doing a certain thing as
a consideration for the promise to sell certain goods at fixed prices ... " Texas
Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 Fed. 19, 23 (5th Cir. 1922).
15. Nassau Supply Co. v. Ice Service Co., 252 N.Y. 277, 169 N.E. 383 (1929).
Since the contract is for requirements, not demands, a buyer will not be allowed
to stock up in anticipation of future needs before he begins business and actually has
requirements. See Dowd v. Hercules Powder Co., 66 Colo. 302, 181 Pac. 767
(1919). Such a limitation is continued by the stipulation of the UCC that the con-
tract is for "actual" needs.
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with non-established businesses, although the similarity of this problem to
that of the jobber suggests that these contracts are also valid under the
Code. Where a buyer expecting to enter business makes a requirements
contract, the Code's implication that he has agreed to take his good faith
requirements would logically mean that he has a duty to undertake the
new enterprise, with its resulting requirements, except for a good faith
reason; this duty should provide adequate consideration for the contract.
The problem of certainty of the contract may be more perplexing here than
where a jobber's contract is involved. The jobber at least has an existing
business set-up, the normal operation of which can provide some stability
to his requirements; but the extent of the non-established buyer's good
faith obligation may be difficult to prove in a subsequent suit for enforce-
ment. Where the contemplated scope of the enterprise can be determined,
the good faith standard makes possible a definition of the buyer's obliga-
tion, and should therefore save the contract from lack of certainty; but
where the parties' intentions in respect to size of the new enterprise are un-
revealed, courts which presently hold such contracts void may find no
change made by the Code.
EXTENT OF THE OBLIGATION
Most current problems in the area of requirements contracts occur
not in establishing the validity of the contract, but in defining the extent
of the obligations created by an. admittedly enforceable contract. While
the amount of goods to be supplied under the contract is inherently flexible,
there are some limits to the minimum demands which will fulfill the buyer's
obligation and the maximum which the seller can be expected to supply.
Under current law, these limits are in some respects diverse or uncertain;
courts generally indicate that they apply a good faith standard to deter-
mine obligations, but there is no clear agreement as to the meaning of good
faith."6
The Code implies an agreement that requirements are to be those
occurring in good faith, except that the buyer's demands may not exceed
an amount reasonably proportionate to any stated estimate or "to any
normal or otherwise comparable prior" demand.17 As to the meaning
of good faith, the general definitions section of the Code defines it as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 's But, as the
comment to that section 19 points out, in other sections of the Code more
16. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel Fabricating Co., 189 F.2d 629 (10th
Cir. 1951) (where estimate of 125 tons, buyer not bound to take more than 51
tons absent a showing of "bad faith") ; Poston v. Western Dairy Products Co., 129
Wash. 73, 36 P.2d 65 (1934) (breach of contract where buyer's requirements
diminished as a result of buyer's disparagement of seller's product to consumers
in favor of competing product); Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87
N.W. 761 (1901) (increase in requirements due to buyer's price cutting to create
demand held good faith).
17. See text at note 62 infra for discussion of effect of previous requirements.
18. UCC § 1-201 (19).
19. UCC § 1-201, comment 19.
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than "honesty in fact" is required; for instance, in the Sales Article, which
contains the requirements contract section, good faith includes "observance
of reasonable commercial standards" insofar as merchants' transactions are
concerned.2 0 That the framers of the Code intended to impose upon mer-
chants a higher standard of conduct than "honesty in fact" is specifically
stated in the comments to a section of the Commercial Paper Article
which also defines good faith in terms of "reasonable commercial stand-
ards" : 21
"... The 'reasonable commercial standards' language added here
and incomparable [sic] provisions elsewhere in the Act, e.g., Section
2-103, merely makes explicit what has long been implicit in case-
law handling of the 'good faith' concept. A business man engaging in
a commercial transaction is not entitled to claim the peculiar advan-
tages which the law accords to the good faith purchaser . . . on a
bare showing of 'honesty in fact' when his actions fail to meet the
generally accepted standards current in his business, trade or profes-
sion." 2
Whether or not such a standard has been "long implicit in case-law" 2
in the requirements contract area, it is clear that reasonable commercial
standards is a vital measuring stick of requirements contracts under the
Code. The actual content of this standard can only be refined in connec-
tion with each of the specific problems which arises in attempting to deter-
mine the extent of the parties' obligations.
Duty to Enter Business
Where a buyer contracts to take the requirements of a business which
he has not yet established, assuming the validity of the contract, there
remains the problem of whether, or under what circumstances, failure or
delay in embarking on the business venture constitutes a breach by the
buyer. The problem is illustrated by Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime
Corp.24 where buyer, after having taken no requirements for the first
seven months of a contract for his requirements of bunker oil, began to sell
to ships and demanded oil from seller under the contract. When seller
refused to supply him, buyer sued for breach. The court held immaterial
the absence of purchases during the first seven months, despite the fact
that buyer's lack of requirements may have been dictated by considerations
of price, since requirements began when prices of oil rose.
20. UCC §2-103(1)(b).
21. UCC §3-302 (1) (b).
22. UCC § 3-302, comment 1.
23. Compare Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co.,
102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939) ; New York Central Ironworks Co. v. United States
Radiator Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967 (1903), with Brawley v. United States,
96 U.S. 168 (1877); Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 190
F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1951).
24. 279 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1922).
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Under the Code courts may, to assure consideration by the buyer, hold
that the duty to have good faith requirements includes a duty not to delay
the entry into business in order to avoid loss under the contract. According
to this view, where failure to embark on the enterprise is due to lack of
capital,2 5 technological changes,26 ill health, or some equally compelling
reason, it would probably meet the Code's good faith requirement, but in a
situation like Texas Co. the Code would require close scrutiny of buyer's
motives for the delay in having requirements. An especially difficult prob-
lem would be presented if buyer claims to have abandoned the projected
venture not for some compelling reason such as lack of capital or technolog-
ical changes, but as a matter of personal choice unrelated to any considera-
tions of the requirements contract. An analogy to existing law which
defines buyer's duty to stay in business in a similar situation suggests
that here the buyer might be held to his contract. 27
On the other hand, courts faced with the question of buyer's duty to
enter business may be reluctant to impose such a duty, and may avoid this
imposition by holding the contract to be subject to the condition precedent
that buyer enter business. 28 In this case, consideration for the contract
would be provided by buyer's agreement to buy only from seller if he does
enter business; 29 buyer could refrain from entering business for any rea-
son at all.s3
Duty to Remain in Business
A requirements contract may not deal expressly with the problem
raised when one party to it abandons or sells his business before the period
stated by the contract has elapsed. 1 The cases seem to indicate that there
is an obligation to remain in business unless to do so would be economically
unjustified, as where the requirements buyer's market has virtually dis-
appeared and he closes his plant,3 2 a confiscatory tariff makes it impossible
for the output seller to continue production,38 or some other impossibility
25. Cf. Kenan, McKay & Spier v. Yorkville Cotton Oil Co., 260 Fed. 28 (4th
Cir. 1919) (discontinued business).
26. Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d
'630 (10th Cir. 1939); McKeever Cook & Co. v. Canonsburg Iron Co., 138 Pa.
184, 20 At. 938 (1890).
27. See notes 35 and 39 infra.
28. No particular form of words is necessary to create a condition precedent,
such a finding being a matter of interpretation. RxSTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 258
(1932).
29. See 1 CoRBIN, CoNMAcrs §§ 156, 157 (1950); 1 WnLIsToN, CONTRACTS
§ 104A (Williston and Thompson's ed. 1936).
30. The fact that the condition is some performance by one of the parties and
that that party refuses to perform the act on which contractual obligations are de-
pendent does not alone constitute a breach. REsTATEmENT, CoNnm.crs § 257 (1932).
31. See, for example, the contract involved in Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal
Corp., 115 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1940).
32. Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130
F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1942).
33. Sheesley v. Bisbee Linseed Co., 337 Pa. 197, 10 A.2d 401 (1940).
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intervenes, such as destruction of buyer's business.3 4 On the other hand,
buyer's mere desire to be rid of the business or to avoid some risk of loss
does not justify cessation.3 5 Substantial reliance by the other party is
sometimes an important factor in reaching the conclusion that cessation is
unjustified.3 6 It should be noted, however, that the language used in some
of these cases is somewhat broader than the holdings on the facts. Some
opinions indicate that there is no obligation to remain in business at all,37
while others would apparently permit no excuse other than impossibility.38
Nevertheless, the great majority imply a good faith standard by which
reasons for cessation are to be measured.
39
The Code treatment of this problem seems to be in accord with the
prevailing rules,40 since reasonable commercial standards should relieve
buyer of a duty to continue in business where continuance would result in
a serious loss for reasons other than the requirements contract, but should
prohibit cessation merely to avoid the contract or to avoid a minor loss.
The Code's adoption of the prevailing rules would remove any uncer-
tainty which may exist in those states which have indicated that they either
imply no obligation to remain in business 41 or excuse cessation only for
impossibility.
42
Definition of Requirements
Without the Code:-Where the courts are called upon to determine
whether buyer is ordering too much or too little under a requirements con-
tract, they look to several factors to determine the parties' intentions.
Where a maximum or minimum amount is specified by the contract, courts.
of course give effect to that provision.3 An estimate of expected require-
34. The rule of excuse from performance due to supervening impossibility is,
of course, not peculiar to requirements contracts but is one of general application.
See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS * 454-467 (1932).
35. Diamond Alkali Co. v. Tomson & Co., 35 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1929); Great
Lakes & St. Lawrence Trans. Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 Fed. 603 (7th Cir.
1917) ; Wigand v. Bachman-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 118 N.E. 518
(1918). But cf. Drake v. Vorse, 52 Iowa 417, 3 N.W. 465 (1879).
36. Diamond Alkali Co. v. Tomson & Co., supra note 35.
37. Drake v. Vorse, supra note 35; Helena Light & Ry. v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
57 Mont. 93, 186 Pac. 702 (1920).
38. See, e.g., Cragin Products Co. v. Fitch, 6 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1925). Cf. Wells
v. Alexandre, 130 N.Y. 642, 29 N.E. 142 (1891) (even though defendant sold ships
and went out of business he was held liable on requirements contract for the
amount of coal which the ships used during year).
39. Sheesley v. Bisbee Linseed Co., 337 Pa. 197, 10 A.2d 401 (1940) ; Fort Wayne
Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co., 130 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1942);
Du Boff v. Matam Corp., 272 App. Div. 502, 71 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1st Dep't 1947);
Great Lakes & St. Lawrence Trans. Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 Fed. 603 (7th
Cir. 1917).
40. I.e., that good faith business reasons will excuse cessation. See, e.g.,
Sheesley v. Bisbee Linseed Co., 337 Pa. 197, 10 A.2d 401 (1940) ; Fort Wayne Corru-
gated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co., 130 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1942); cf.
Du Boff v. Matam Corp., 272 App. Div. 502, 71 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1st Dep't 1947).
41. See cases cited note 37 supra.
42. See cases cited note 38 supra.
43. Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 160 Ill. 85, 43 N.E. 774
(1896) ; Diamond Alkali Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 264 Pa. 304 (1919).
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ments contained in a contract may, without the Code, be treated as having
been made simply for the convenience of the parties and of no operative
significance. 44 For example, a contract calling for defendant's output of
cotton linters, "about 400 bales," was held not to have been breached when
defendant supplied only 155 bales, absent a showing that the reduced
production was motivated by bad faith.4 5 A similar result was obtained
where the contract was for "approximately 125 tons" of steel, and only 51
tons were required.
46
In the absence of any stated minimum or maximum, some courts have
said that the requirements are measured only by buyer's actual needs so
long as he buys only from seller.47  Most courts, however, use buyer's past
requirements as a guide; some have even refused to enforce requirements
contracts when there are no past requirements by which the conduct of
the parties might be measured.48 The deviation typically permitted from
past requirements is one in the normal course of business and not for pur-
poses of exploitation or expansion; frequently courts talk in terms of a
"good faith" deviation 49 but no clear formulation of "good faith" has been
made. For example, where at the time of execution of a requirements
contract for bituminous coal a school board had been using 1000 tons of
bituminous and an equivalent amount of anthracite, and the board
removed the anthracite burners shortly thereafter, bituminous seller could
not be forced to supply 2200 tons at the contract price 50 Although the
court stated that the price of bituminous coal advanced around the time the
anthracite burners were removed, there was no clear indication of bad faith
-in buyer's attempt to secure 2200 tons under the contract; it is the fact
that buyer used anthracite as well as bituminous at the time the contract
was made which persuaded the court. However, the court added that if
enlargement of the school buildings, increased attendance, or weather condi-
tions had caused the increased demand, rather than the unforeseeable re-
moval of the anthracite burners, seller would have had to supply this de-
mand under the contract.5 1 Similarly, where a requirements seller at-
44. Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168 (1877); Cragin Products Co. v.
Fitch, 6 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1925); Holmes & Co. v. Detroit, 158 Mich. 137, 122
N.W. 506 (1909); cf. Andrews Coal Co. v. Board of Directors, 151 La. 695, 92
So. 303 (1922). But cf. Poland Coal Co. v. Rogers, 260 Pa. 118, 103 Atl. 559
(1918).
45. Kenan, McKay & Spier v. Yorkville Cotton Oil Co., 260 Fed. 28 (4th Cir.
1919).
46. Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel Fabricating Co., 189 F.2d 629 (10th Cir.
1951).
47. E.g., Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N.W. 761 (1901).
48. See cases cited note 13 supra.
49. E.g., Kenan, McKay & Spier v. Home Fertilizer & Cotton Oil Co., 202 Ala.
29, 79 So. 367 (1918) ; New York Central Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator
Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967 (1903); Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel Fabricating
Co., 189 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1951).
50. Andrews Coal Co. v. Board of Directors, 151 La. 695, 92 So. 303 (1922)
(the contract also contained an estimate, but the court accorded little weight to
this factor).
51. Id. at 701, 92 So. at 304.
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tempted to resist buyer's increased demands during a war, the buyer was
upheld because of his past history as a large-scale operator.52 At the trial,
the jury was told to consider the history and previous scope of buyer's
business and its normal growth, but to disregard the war and other
unlooked-for influences in determining the permissible increase; and that
seller need not deliver all buyer might want because of a radical change in
the market price or other causes not fairly within the contemplation of
the parties. 3
Where seller's complaint is that the demanded requirements are too
small, rather than too large, similar tests are applied. Where buyer lays
off part of his sales force or curtails production because of lack of demand,
he is not liable to seller for any reduction in requirements.5 4 If, on the
other hand, the cut in staff is dictated by a desire to avoid selling at a loss
or a very small profit, buyer should be liable for the amount of require-
ments which would result from a full staff.55 Sometimes a decrease in
requirements results from buyer's employment of a substitute for the
seller's item.5 6  The present attitude of the courts seems to be that
buyer agreed only to take what he needed of item X; if item Y is more to
buyer's liking he is not bound to forego its use in favor of X.57 For
example, where a requirements buyer replaced worn-out equipment with a
modern plant which enabled him to utilize waste heat, thereby reducing his
requirements of natural gas, the court held him not in breach, stating that a
requirements buyer does not breach by keeping abreast of modern develop-
ments.5 8 Where, however, a buyer resorted to the use of a substitute for
seller's product until prices rose, at which time he demanded that seller
resume supplying his requirements, the court excused seller from further
performance on the ground that buyer's conduct had amounted to a breach
since it was not motivated by good faith business reasons. 9
52. Anaheim Sugar Co. v. Jenkins & Co., 274 Fed. 504 (9th Cir. 1921). See also
Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958 (9th Cir. 1918), cert. denied,
257 U.S. 658 (1922).
53. Anaheim Sugar Co. v. Jenkins & Co., 274 Fed. 504, 507-8 (9th Cir. 1921)
(reviewing and affirming the instructions of the trial court). Courts in allowing
large increases have stated, however, that unconscionable conduct will not be al-
lowed. See, e.g., New York Central Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator Co.,
174 N.Y. 331, 335, 66 N.E. 967, 968 (1903).
54. Cf. Helena L. & R. Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 57 Mont. 93, 186 Pac.
702 (1920).
55. Compare Dawson Cotton Oil Co. v. Kenan, McKay & Speir, 21 Ga. App.
688, 94 S.E. 1037 (1917).
56. See Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 Fed. 298
(6th Cir. 1903).
57. Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d
630 (10th Cir. 1939); McKeever, Cook & Co. v. Canonsburg Iron Co., 138 Pa.
184, 16 Atl. 97 (1888). But cf. General Crushed Stone Co. v. Trimpey, 28 North.
360 (Pa. C.P. 1942) (cannot avoid requirements contract by substituting similar
and competing product).
58. Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., supra
note 57.
59. Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., supra note 56.
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A contract for the requirements of a new business presents special
problems in the ascertainment of proper requirements. Since courts are
reluctant to uphold these contracts because of the absence of past require-
ments, 60 where a non-established business' contract is enforced there is
likely to be a stated maximum or minimum 6' or an estimate,6 2 possibly
calculated from existing conditions in like businesses or from surveys
normally made by a person embarking on a new business venture. A
seller who contracts with an unestablished business consciously takes the
risk of fluctuations in the requirements of the unknown business; there-
fore, it would seem that such a contract should be valid in any case, with
the buyer's good faith limiting the requirements which can be demanded.
Under the Code:-The test whereby the extent of permissible varia-
tion will be measured under the Code is somewhat equivocal. According
to the first clause of the requirements section all variations are subject to
the test that they must occur in good faith. But the second clause appears
to limit even a good faith variation to an amount not "unreasonably
disproportionate to a stated estimate" or, in the absence of a stated esti-
mate, to the "normal or otherwise comparable prior" requirements. Thus,
except in the case of a new business which has no history of requirements,
the Code may further limit variations.
A close analysis of the section, however, indicates that the exception
clause is probably of limited application. The clause states that "no
quantity unreasonably disproportionate" to any estimated or "normal or
otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or
demanded." 63 There is a problem in interpreting the meaning and effect
to be given the words "tendered or demanded." Is "tendered" to refer
only to output sellers and "demanded" only to requirements buyers, or do
both words apply equally to both types of contracts? If the good faith
requirements of buyer's business have increased to the point where they
may be deemed "unreasonably disproportionate" to estimated or prior re-
quirements, unless "tendered" applies to requirements contracts the seller
is in a better position than the buyer. He may force the buyer to take
all good faith requirements from him rather than merely a reasonably
proportionate amount, while buyer may not enforce the contract beyond
the reasonable variation; thus seller could benefit from a price decline while
60. See cases cited note 13 supra; Loewus & Co. v. Vischia, 2 N.J. 54, 65
A.2d 604 (1949). See also, Comments, 48 MicH. L. REv. 362 (1950); 26 IND.
L.J. 111 (1950).
61. Texas Co. v. Pensacola Maritime Corp., 279 Fed. 19 (5th Cir. 1922).
62. Compare Ferenczi v. Natural Sulphur Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 262, 166 Atl. 477
(1933), with Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. Thacher, 229 N.Y. 172, 128 N.E.
124 (1920).
63. It could be argued that "normal . . . requirements" is not limited to normal
prior requirements but can refer to requirements normal for the type of business.
Since it seems unlikely that such an elusive standard was intended, the better in-
terpretation is probably that both "normal" and "otherwise comparable" refer to
prior requirements of buyer's business.
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buyer could not take advantage of a rising market. There seems to be no
explanation for this distinction.
On the other hand, should the buyer's good faith requirements decline
an unreasonably disproportionate amount, seller may force buyer to take
up to the reasonable variation if "demanded" means ordered or requested.
This would seem to be the interpretation intended by comment 3
which states that "an agreed estimate is to be regarded as a center
around which the parties intend the variation to occur." But this analysis
leads to a result, contrary to comment 2's claim that good faith discon-
tinuance is permissible, that the Code prohibits discontinuance under any
circumstances. Discontinuance, if anything, would constitute an unreason-
ably disproportionate variation. But the requirements section would work
a radical, and probably unexpected, change in the law if it were interpreted
to prohibit good faith discontinuance of requirements and a construction
to avoid this result is desirable. In some cases the doctrine of impossibility
of performance would mitigate this result, but it is doubtful if good faith
discontinuance was intended to be limited to cases of impossibility alone.
64
One interpretation to save the right of good faith discontinuance would be
to construe the word "unreasonable" to permit a court to consider the
cause of the variation rather than its magnitude; but the juxtaposition of
the words "unreasonably disproportionate" militates against such a read-
ing. Another and more reasonable construction of the exception clause
is that "demanded" has the connotation of a buyer making demands upon
his seller for delivery. Thus, the exception protects the seller only from
demands unreasonably in excess of the stated estimate or prior require-
ments, but does not guarantee to the seller orders of at least a reasonably
proportionate minimum. However, while buyer would not be in breach if
he in good faith orders less than a reasonably proportionate minimum, the
seller would be justified in refusing to deliver any goods not already de-
livered. The seller would not be in breach in so doing, because the buyer
has no right to demand an amount "unreasonably disproportionate."
It may be argued that this section is meant to embody an intent of
the parties at the time of making the contract that the requirements will not
substantially deviate above or below a stated estimate or prior require-
ments; that is, the estimate or prior requirements represents the reason-
able expectations of the parties and should not be tampered with. But to
say this is to attribute to the agreement characteristics of the ordinary con-
tract for a definite amount rather than those of a requirements contract. °3
A requirements contract by its nature manifests a desire for flexibility in
the quantity of goods sold in order to meet ordinary business fluctuations.
To restrict the requirements closely to estimates or prior requirements
would abrogate this chief purpose of such contracts; it is not likely that
such a result was envisioned by the Code.66 Rather is it more feasible to
64. See UCC § 2-615, comment 9.
65. Compare United States v. Republic Bag & Paper Co., 250 Fed. 79 (2d
Cir. 1918); Wadell v. Phillips, 133 Md. 497, 105 Atl. 771 (1919).
66. See UCC § 2-306, comment 2.
REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS
suppose that the proviso in question was designed to remedy a specific prob-
lem, i.e., the buyer's demanding a quantity of goods greatly disproportionate
to that expected by the parties in order to take advantage of market condi-
tions at the seller's expense. The same problem does not exist in the case
of lower demands even when they are disproportionate to the estimate or
prior requirements, because under any circumstances the buyer must take
all of his requirements from seller and has little to gain by decreased re-
quirements.17 Here both parties suffer from adverse market conditions.
The preceding analysis, when applied to the pre-Code law defining the
quantity of requirements, indicates that the greatest change effected by the
Code may come not from the good faith provision but from the limitation
to a reasonably proportionate amount. The meaning of "good faith" under
the Code is not perfectly clear, but it would seem that generally the results
of decided cases will not be changed by this provision, since courts appear
for the most part to have applied a good faith standard in the past. The
Code does clarify, and in some cases changes, the result where buyer's good
faith requirements become unreasonably higher than a stated estimate or
prior requirements. Assume a contract for the requirements of a going
business with past requirements of 100 tons of steel annually; for good faith
reasons these requirements rise to 300 tons. Under some decided cases 68
and under the good faith provision, seller would be required to furnish
300 tons, but the clause excepting unreasonably disproportionate amounts
places a ceiling on demands allowable here. This result, dictated by the
prior requirements (and estimate) proviso of the Code, is probably a rea-
sonable one viewed from the standpoint of the parties' intention. Typically,
the parties would not contemplate that the requirements would rise un-
reasonably above the past standards or a stated estimate.
Where present requirements decrease considerably, there is a serious
problem as to whether the Code's previous requirements provision changes
prior law. Assume, for instance, past requirements (or a stated estimate)
of 300 tons and present good faith requirements of 50 tons. Under the
law prior to the Code, the contract probably would be upheld for the 50
tons so long as the decrease was for a "good faith" reason.6 9 The same
result would obtain under the Code in this case if the stated estimate or
prior requirement proviso were interpreted to allow good faith decreases
in order to save the right to cease operations.
70
67. See Note, 28 CoL. L. REv. 223 (1928).
68. Holmes & Co. v. Detroit, 158 Mich. 137, 122 N.W. 506 (1909); Sherman
Mach. & Iron Works v. Carey, Lombard, Young & Co., 100 Okla. 29, 227 Pac.
110 (1924); cf. Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N.W. 761 (1901);
Anaheim Sugar Co. v. Jenkins & Co., 274 Fed. 504 (9th Cir. 1921); Andrews
Coal Co. v. Board of Directors, 151 La. 695, 92 So. 303 (1922). See also Ehrenworth
v. Stuhmer & Co., 229 N.Y. 210, 128 N.E. 108 (1920) (orders for bread increased
gradually in seven years from 50 or 60 to three or four hundred loaves per week;
contract held enforceable.).
69. Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168 (1877); Kellogg Co. v. Standard
Steel Fabricating Co., 189 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1951).
70. See text following note 64 supra.
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If, on the other hand, "no quantity unreasonably disproportionate" is
construed to require a conclusion that the parties must not increase or
decrease the quantity of goods sold in relation to prior requirements or a
stated estimate, then it would seem that the law prior to the Code is
changed.
CONCLUSION
The requirements section of the Code purports to apply " . the
general approach . . . [of the Code] which requires the reading of com-
mercial background and intent into the language of any agreement and
demands good faith in the performance of that agreement." 71 Since the
Code cannot explicitly answer all problems which may arise, resort to
commercial background and the parties' intent should be helpful in resolv-
ing ambiguities. Although the Code's good faith standard has removed
any doubt which remains as to the validity of most requirements
contracts, there is a possible exception for a contract for the re-
quirements of a non-established business, where a problem of uncertainty
may remain. Consideration of commercial background and probable intent
of the parties suggests that no requirements contract should be held invalid
for uncertainty, since uncertainty is bargained for and its risk assumed
in these contracts. Likewise, the intent to make a binding contract for a
non-established business should not be over-ridden by the requirement of
a duty to enter business. It is unclear whether such a duty exists under
the Code; the most reasonable interpretation of the parties' intent would
be to find an expectation that the business venture would be undertaken,
but it is not unreasonable to say that the contract applies only if business
is entered.
The amount of requirements which will be considered proper by the
Code is subject to the general limitation of good faith, which results in
little change in prevailing case law and will generally be consistent with
the intent of the parties. Probably the additional limitation to an amount
not unreasonably disproportionate to a stated estimate or prior require-
ments is only a ceiling on the amount which buyer can require seller to
supply. If this is the only effect to be given the "unreasonably dispro-
portionate" provision, the good faith standard, which applies in every case,
will continue to be the most significant limit on the amount of the require-
ments. Placing a ceiling on the good faith requirements which seller can
be forced to supply is probably in accord with the parties' intention in most
cases, where unlimited liability of seller can be disastrous for him if a rising
market causes an excessive increase in buyer's good faith requirements.
The fact that in some cases the parties may have intended unlimited lia-
bility of the seller, which intent cannot be given effect under the Code,
merely points up the fact that the goal of the Code must be to provide the
71. UCC § 2-306, comment 1.
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most reasonable rule for a majority of cases; some anomalous results must
remain under any codification. These results, of course, can be prevented
initially by careful drafting of requirements contracts, especially where con-
flicts appear between the Code's language and the comments thereto. The
most important guarantee of the Code's success, however, lies in the careful
application of its provisions in a manner consonant with business practices.
